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Abstract
Most donors of external financing for health use allocation policies to determine which countries
are eligible to receive financial support and how much support each should receive. Currently,
most of these policies place a great deal of weight on income per capita as a determinant of aid al-
location but there is increasing interest in putting more weight on other country characteristics in
the design of such policies. It is unclear, however, how much weight should be placed on other
country characteristics. Using an online discrete choice experiment designed to elicit preferences
over country characteristics to guide decisions about the allocation of external financing for health,
we find that stakeholders assign a great deal of importance to health inequalities and the burden of
disease but put very little weight on income per capita. We also find considerable variation in pref-
erences across stakeholders, with people from low- and middle-income countries putting more
weight on the burden of disease and people from high-income countries putting more weight on
health inequalities. These findings suggest that stakeholders put more weight on burden of disease
and health inequalities than on income per capita in evaluating which countries should received
external financing for health and that that people living in aid recipient may have different
preferences than people living in donor countries. Donors may wish to take these differences
in preferences in mind if they are reconsidering their aid allocation policies.
Keywords: Development assistance for health, health policy, discrete choice, priority setting, health politics
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Introduction
Most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) receive some ex-
ternal financing for health, including development assistance for
health (DAH) and other forms of assistance, from donor agencies
and other international actors to support the delivery of health ser-
vices. Since 2000, there has been a rapid increase in the annual level
of DAH provided by donors (Ravishankar et al. 2009). Increased ex-
ternal financing has been driven by increased aid from bilateral
donors, the establishment of new multilateral agencies (e.g. Gavi),
and from the rise of global health philanthropies (e.g. the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation) (Murray et al. 2011). However, since
2010, commitments of DAH from major donors have plateaued
(Dieleman et al. 2015), leading to calls for improving the prioritiza-
tion of external financing for health to generate more “value for the
money”. For example, donors have increasingly discussed the need
to increase the efficiency of existing programs (Gre´pin 2012a).
Others have called for donors to allocate external financing in a way
that more closely aligns with the global burden of disease (Dieleman
et al. 2014). And a Center for Global Development working group
has called on donors to prioritize programs on the basis of
cost-effectiveness, which could save more lives and promote equity
(Glassman and Chalkidou 2012).
Most donors of external financing for health use some sort of al-
location policy to determine which countries are eligible to receive
financing as well as how much financing they should be allocated
(Ottersen et al. 2017). Here, we define an allocation policy as an ex-
plicit or implicit rule used to determine both whether a country is
eligible to receive external financing as well as the amount of financ-
ing that a country receives. Most global health donors currently use
GNI per capita as the basis of their allocation policies but some also
include additional criteria, such as those related to health needs or
aid effectiveness (Ottersen et al. 2017). Several of these allocation
policies are partly expressed in terms of explicit formulae, in which
the amount of aid allocated is a function of one or more country in-
dicators, weighted to reflect donor preferences.
The evolving landscape of external financing for health has led
many global health donors to rethink their allocation policies, which
is in essence a re-prioritization exercise. There is a general agreement
that the primary intent of external financing for health is to improve
health in countries where government resources are insufficient to
fully fund priority health programs. Income per capita is used as a
primary determinant of most allocation policies due mainly to the
fact that it is available for all countries and because it is seen as a
good proxy for overall level of health and development across coun-
tries (Fantom and Serajuddin 2016). But while it is a useful general
indicator, it may be inadequate for guiding the allocation of external
financing for health. One reason for this is GNI per capita is not per-
fectly inversely correlated with population health needs. Another
reason is that GNI per capita only reflects average income and not
its distribution, which means that inequalities are not directly
captured.
As part of an initiative called the Equitable Access Initiative
(EAI, please see http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/equitableaccessini
tiative/ for more information on this initiative), the authors of this
article were involved in a broader research effort that included four
technical teams that were all tasked with developing a new approach
to classify countries with regards to decisions for the allocation ex-
ternal financing for health Ottersen et al. 2017b; Ottersen et al.
2016. The co-convening partners of the EAI included the World
Health Organization, Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, UNAIDS,
UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNITAID and the Global Fund.
All of the frameworks and methodologies proposed by the tech-
nical teams involved identifying additional criteria beyond income
per capita and then combining these criteria together in some way to
generate overall country rankings to guide aid allocation decisions.
A key open question that arose during the EAI process was that in
order to combine different criteria into a single equation or formu-
lae, whether implicitly or explicitly, donors need to determine how
much emphasis, or weight, to put on any given criteria in their over-
all assessment of countries. It also became apparent through this
process that different stakeholders had different preferences for how
much weight should be placed on each of these country-level criteria
in decisions about external financing for health and it therefore was
unclear how these criteria should be combined.
One strand of the academic literature has investigated the deter-
minants of existing aid allocation patterns across donors. In the gen-
eral aid allocation literature, while income per capita is almost
always negatively associated with the amount of aid a country re-
ceives, studies have found that other factors also influence aid allo-
cation, including political factors (Alesina and Dollar 2000;
Kuziemko and Werker 2006) and quality of governance in aid re-
cipient countries (Dollar and Levin 2006). Within the health sector,
a few studies have also investigated the factors that influence DAH
allocation patterns. One study that looked at official DAH commit-
ments from 2005-07, found that burden of disease measures only
weakly predicted how much health aid a country received (Esser
2011). Another study found that after controlling for income per
capita and burden of disease, measures of political rights and levels
of corruption also predicted aid allocation patterns (Fielding 2011).
A more recent study has found that global health donors do respond
to the health needs of a country in that countries with higher levels
of infant mortality, child mortality and HIV mortality receive more
health aid, controlling for donor and recipient government level fac-
tors, than other countries (Lee and Lim 2014). While this literature
can be useful in terms of informing the discussion of aid allocation,
the EAI was motivated by a desire to answer the question about
how global health donors should prioritize aid across countries and
not necessarily how aid is currently allocated.
One methodology that can be used to elicit preferences for deriv-
ing weights across country criteria is a discrete choice experiment
(DCE). This is a quantitative technique to empirically elicit respond-
ents’ stated preferences over choice alternatives with different charac-
teristics (Ryan and Gerard 2008). DCEs have gained popularity in the
health economics literature over the past 20 years. They have also in-
creasingly been used to elicit preferences to inform health policy and
priority-setting questions in LMICs (Mangham et al. 2009). DCEs
provide respondents with a series of hypothetical choice sets and ask
respondents to choose their preferred alternative from within each
choice set. By making a choice, it is believed that respondents are re-
vealing their true preferences over the characteristics of the alterna-
tives. DCEs have roots in random utility theory, which assumes that
the respondent evaluates alternatives based on their utility for him or
her and then selects the one that provides the most utility.
There have been relatively few studies of stated preferences re-
garding the allocation of aid across countries. Using conjoint ana-
lysis, Bachke et al. (2013) polled a sample of Norwegian university
students and found that different types of respondents have different
preferences for how aid should be allocated, for example with differ-
ent preferences among male and female respondents. In a similar
study, Cunningham et al. (2016) found that university students in
New Zealand rank aid effectiveness highly, almost on par with aid
programs that prioritize country need. Hansen et al. (2014) also find
that university students in New Zealand rank concerns such as
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health needs and infrastructure more highly than income per capita
in deciding which countries to donate money to. To our knowledge,
no studies on the allocation of aid have elicited the preferences of
people from both LMICs and high-income countries, and no studies
have elicited the preferences of real-world stakeholders, rather than
just university students. Moreover, no study, to our knowledge, has
specifically elicited preferences for the allocation of external financ-
ing for health across countries.
The purpose of this article is to report on a survey that elicited
preferences of different stakeholders for criteria guiding the alloca-
tion of external financing for health across countries using an online
DCE. We first provide a brief summary of the methods, before ana-
lysing the results of the DCE, and then discuss the implications of
these findings for the development of new frameworks for ranking
countries for the allocation of external financing for health.
Methods
To elicit preferences, we developed a DCE that we administered as
an online survey using Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). A key elem-
ent of the design of any DCE is the choice of attributes, or country
characteristics, to be included into the experiment. To identify these
attributes, we first conducted a background review on the motiv-
ations for aid allocation in the academic literature. In addition, we
also conducted 20 key informant interviews with stakeholders
involved with the EAI, including representatives of the EAI co-
convening partners, representatives of both donor and receiving
countries, and civil society organizations, about what they perceived
as the key criteria that should be used in ranking countries for health
aid allocation purposes (Ottersen et al. 2016). Based on this back-
ground research and our interviews, we developed a list of potential
country criteria. In order for the survey to be easy for the respond-
ents to completed, we then selected four criteria that were com-
monly cited in our background research, that we believed would be
easily understood by the survey respondents, and which were as mu-
tually exclusive from one another as possible. The four country cri-
teria we selected were: income per capita, overall burden of disease,
strength of the health system, and level of health inequality. Prior to
launching the DCE, we also presented these four criteria during the
EAI consultation process to get feedback prior to launching the
survey.
For each country characteristic, we then defined the levels of im-
portance for each. For income per capita, since level of income is the
primary determinant of which countries received aid, we decided
that it was unlikely that any respondent would not put any emphasis
on income per capita in the allocation of aid, so for it the choices
were low, medium and high levels of importance. For the other crite-
ria, we defined three levels of importance for each criteria: no, some
or high level of importance. Based on our choice of country charac-
teristics and levels of importance, we ended up with an experimental
design that included 81 possible frameworks (3  3  3  3). This
leads to a very large number of potential pairs of frameworks to pre-
sent to each respondent using paired choice sets, which was deemed
to be impractical (Lancsar and Louviere 2008). To simplify the
choices, we developed an orthogonal main-effects plan with high
levels of balance and minimal overlap to reduce the number of ques-
tions each respondent needed to answer down to 9 (Huber and
Zwerina 1996; Street et al. 2005). An example choice from the sur-
vey is shown in Figure 1.
Respondents were also asked to answer background questions
about their age, gender, country of birth, highest level of education
completed and type of organization in which they worked. Some
variables were recoded as dummy binary variables (male vs female,
born in a high vs LMIC) to simplify the analysis. All respondents
were asked to provide informed consent and this research compo-
nent received ethical approval from our institute. Please see the
Supplementary Appendix (Supplementary data are available at
Health Policy and Planning online) to this paper for more details
and specifics of the survey itself.
The data from the DCE were used to estimate a mixed logit
model, which is an appropriate method for modelling data on dis-
crete choices between two or more alternatives (Ryan and Gerard
2008). All of the analysis was carried out in Stata using the mixlogit
command (Hole 2007).
The EAI convening partners assisted us with generating a sample
of respondents for the survey. From the Global Fund, we received a
list of e-mail addresses of people who had recently expressed interest
in participating in a regional partnership forum or an online eForum
at the Global Fund. The majority of people on this mailing list were
either members of civil society or were practitioners involved in
health aid-related activities in LMICs. For the other convening part-
ners, EAI focal points were e-mailed and asked to forward the
Figure 1. Example of one of the choice sets presented to stakeholders
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survey to members of their organization with a request to complete
the survey. We sent 1500 e-mail invitations, but are unable to
know exactly how many people received an invitation to complete
the survey.
Results
A total of 285 people consented and completed the survey. Slightly
less than half of the sample (45.3%) was female. The sample was
highly educated, with only 19.3% reporting an undergraduate de-
gree or less. The sample had broad geographic coverage with re-
sponses coming from almost 90 countries. Respondents were most
likely to have been born in a high-income country (35.8%), followed
by a lower middle-income country (34.0%), a low-income country
(15.8%) and an upper middle-income country (14.8%). Civil society
organizations were well represented in the sample—accounting for
44.6% of the respondents. International organizations and aca-
demic/consultant institutions were also well represented (28.8 and
11.2%, respectively). An equal share of respondents worked for aid
donor and recipient governments, with 4.6% for each. See Table 1
for a full description of the sample.
Our primary findings are summarized in Table 2. The relative
magnitudes of the mean coefficients indicate the relative importance
attributed to each of the levels of each country characteristics in the
full sample of responses, on average. Overall, the strongest predictor
of framework choice was whether the framework assigned high im-
portance to the level of burden of disease or health inequalities. In
other words, a framework that placed high importance for burden
of disease or health inequalities had a greater chance of being chosen
than a framework without this property (holding all other character-
istics constant). Beyond these criteria, positive but less influential de-
terminants of framework choice included some level of importance
assigned to either burden of disease or health inequalities, and high
importance assigned to strength of the health system. Respondents
placed much less weight on how much importance the frameworks
assigned to income per capita. The estimated standard deviations in
the mixed logit models indicate that there is significant preference
heterogeneity among the respondents for the high importance levels
of each country characteristic. This indicates that individual re-
spondents’ preferences can deviate markedly from the general trend
described above, and suggests that stakeholders differ in their prefer-
ences for any model that puts a high level of weight on any one of
these country criteria. In addition, the alternative-specific constant
for Framework A is negative and significant, which shows a prefer-
ence for Framework B over Framework A, holding the country char-
acteristics constant. This is unexpected, as there is no reason to
prefer one framework over another on any other basis than the
country characteristics. Dropping the alternative-specific constant
from the model, however, did not have a qualitative impact on the
results.
In Table 3, we also show how framework choices varied by
whether the respondent was born in a high-income country or an
LMIC (according to the World Bank classification for 2014). These
groupings of countries were selected due to the fact that the former
are typically aid donor countries while the latter are typically aid re-
cipient countries. Respondents born in what is now an LMIC were
most influenced by whether the frameworks assign high importance
to burden of disease, followed by high importance to level of health
inequalities, and some importance to burden of disease. In contrast,
respondents who were born in a high-income country ranked high
importance of health inequalities as the most important country
characteristic, followed by high importance of the burden of disease
and some importance of health inequalities. Neither group put a
great deal of weight on the importance of income per capita. As in
the pooled sample there is evidence of significant preference hetero-
geneity among the respondents in each group. The alternative-
specific constant is negative and significant for the LMIC group,
which is unexpected for the reasons discussed above, while it is
small and insignificant for the high-income group in line with our
expectations.
Table 1. Summary statistics of sample
Completed responses N %
285 100
Gender
Female 129 45.3
Education
Undergraduate or less 55 19.3
Graduate degree 149 52.3
Medical degree 33 11.6
PhD 36 12.6
Other or unknown 12 4.2
Organizational affiliation
Civil society organization 127 44.6
International organization 82 28.8
Academic/commentator/consultant 32 11.2
Government receiving external assistance 13 4.6
Government providing external assistance 13 4.6
Industry 4 1.4
Other 14 4.9
Location of respondents By country of birth By country of residence
Total number of countries 89 88
High Income 102 35.8% 103 36.1%
Upper Middle Income 41 14.4% 40 14.0%
Lower Middle Income 97 34.0% 97 34.0%
Low Income 45 15.8% 45 15.8%
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Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities generated from the
mixed logit models presented in Tables 2 and 3. There are two com-
peting frameworks, for which the attribute levels have been set as
“No/low importance” for all attributes except one for Framework
B, which has the level shown in the figure. For example in the first
row, “health inequality—high”, shows the probability of choosing a
framework that has “No/low importance” for income, health sys-
tem and disease burden and high importance for health inequality
(Framework B), over another framework that has “No/low import-
ance” for all of the attributes (Framework A). The figure presents
the predicted probabilities for the full sample, as well as for people
from LMICs and high-income countries separately. The predicted
Table 2. Importance of attributes in framework choice, full sample
Attribute Mean Standard deviation
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Country income (omitted: low importance)
Medium importance 0.27 0.03 0.05 0.87
High importance 0.21 0.11 0.81 0.00
Burden of disease (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 1.26 0.00 0.01 0.98
High importance 1.86 0.00 1.56 0.00
Strength of health system (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 0.67 0.00 0.09 0.76
High importance 1.12 0.00 0.59 0.00
Level of health inequality (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 1.08 0.00 0.22 0.48
High importance 1.80 0.00 1.04 0.00
Alternative-specific constant
Framework A 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.07
Number of observations 5130
Number of responses 2565
Number of respondents 285
Number of responses per respondent 9
Log likelihood 1399.88
Pseudo R2 0.21
Notes: All random coefficients are specified to be normally distributed, and the coefficients reported in the “Mean” and “Standard deviation” columns report
the estimated moments of the distribution. 500 Halton draws were used to approximate the log-likelihood function in the simulated likelihood procedure.
Table 3. Importance of attributes for framework choice, sample split by income level of country of birth
Attribute High Income Country Low and Middle Income Country
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Country income (omitted: low importance)
Medium importance 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.49 0.29 0.06 0.34 0.13
High importance 0.03 0.91 1.44 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.60 0.00
Burden of disease (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 1.34 0.00 0.07 0.84 1.36 0.00 0.06 0.84
High importance 1.98 0.00 1.94 0.00 2.04 0.00 1.59 0.00
Strength of health system (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 1.47 0.00 0.09 0.88 0.35 0.11 0.05 0.90
High importance 1.42 0.00 0.53 0.18 1.10 0.00 0.81 0.00
Level of health inequality (omitted: no importance)
Some importance 1.61 0.00 0.17 0.85 0.94 0.00 0.37 0.14
High importance 2.47 0.00 1.13 0.00 1.70 0.00 1.19 0.00
Alternative-specific constant
Framework A 0.01 0.91 0.22 0.56 0.23 0.00 0.39 0.02
Number of observations 1836 3294
Number of responses 918 1647
Number of respondents 102 183
Number of responses per respondent 9 9
Log likelihood 478.20 901.57
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.21
Notes: All random coefficients are specified to be normally distributed, and the coefficients reported in the “Mean” and “Standard deviation” columns report
the estimated moments of the distribution. 500 Halton draws were used to approximate the log-likelihood function in the simulated likelihood procedure.
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probabilities reveal the same overall preference pattern as the esti-
mated coefficients, but with the added benefit of having a straight-
forward quantitative interpretation.
Discussion
This DCE elicited preferences for frameworks for the allocation of
external financing for health that differ in the importance they as-
signed to each of four country characteristics. Overall, the findings
suggest that our surveyed stakeholders rank the country characteris-
tics in the following order of decreasing importance: level of health
inequality, burden of disease, strength of health system and income
per capita. The findings also suggest that different stakeholders dif-
fer in their preferences, in particular, respondents from LMICs
attributed lower importance to inequality and strength of the health
system than respondents from high-income countries. However,
both groups of respondents ranked income per capita as the least im-
portant characteristic. In addition, we also observed high levels of
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for all frameworks that put
high importance to any of the country characteristics tested. These
findings can inform policies and decisions on eligibility and alloca-
tion in multiple ways.
First, discrepancies between current policies and our observed
preferences of stakeholders give reason to reconsider current exter-
nal financing for health allocation policies. We found that respond-
ents are most concerned with health inequalities and disease burden
and least concerned with income per capita. This is at odds with cur-
rent policies for eligibility and allocation, which tends to emphasize
income per capita. Gavi, the Global Fund, the World Bank,
UNICEF and UNDP all assign GNI per capita a central role in clas-
sifying countries and allocating funds (Ottersen et al. 2017). Of the
large multilateral donors in global health, the Global Fund is the
one that adjusts GNI per capita most explicitly for disease burden in
classifying countries and determining eligibility, however it was not
until 2013 that it gave disease burden this significant role
(Kapilashrami and Hanefeld 2014). To our knowledge no donor ex-
plicitly uses measures of health inequality in their allocation policies.
The findings from the survey thus give most donors reason to recon-
sider their policies for the eligibility and allocation of external
financing for health. In particular, the survey provides reason to
examine if GNI per capita gets too much weight and health inequal-
ities and disease burden too little. However, variation in preferences
for all of the models with high importance suggests that any model
that dramatically shifts weight to a single criteria is also unlikely to
fit the preferences of all stakeholders.
Second, variation across groups of respondents gives reason to
reconsider whose values and preferences should guide external
financing for health. In particular, we found significant differences
in preferences across respondents from LMICs and high-income
countries. Since donors tend to come from wealthier countries and
those on the receiving end of external financing tend to be from
poorer countries, this finding provides concrete input to discussions
about aid alignment (Sridhar 2010). Donors have been criticized for
giving too much priority for donor priority programs at the expense
of health systems or national health priorities (Gre´pin 2012b). On
the basis of the findings from this study, donors may wish to system-
atically consider the preferences of people living in LMICs in the re-
design of their allocation policies, for example through the use of
public opinion polls or an additional survey building off this study.
Third, by being one of the first of its kind, this study provides a
basis for further inquiry into preferences for the allocation of exter-
nal financing for health. Future studies should attempt to address
some of the limitations of this study. First, like all stated-preference
studies, our study results are sensitive to the framing of the questions
and choices we used, including the fact that this was an online sur-
vey. Second, also like all stated-preference studies, our findings are
potentially sensitive to which country characteristics were included
in the survey. Being the first study of its nature, there were no previ-
ous studies to use to help guide the choices of country characteris-
tics. While we used a review of the literature as well as interviews
and consultations with stakeholders to identify these characteristics,
the selection of characteristics was still somewhat arbitrary. Future
research should attempt to first pilot additional criteria and to test
the importance of other characteristics as well.
Fourth, for simplicity, we used relatively crude attribute levels
(low/no, some/middle, high), which may be interpreted differently
by different stakeholders and may have influenced our results. The
significant standard deviation on all high importance coefficients
may be due to the broad attribute levels. Future studies could use
more fine-grained levels, but this must be balanced against other
uses of respondents’ time. On a related note, although we consulted
with many stakeholders prior to conducting the surveys, we did not
get the chance to conduct a proper pilot to see how the choice of at-
tributes and levels influenced the preferences of stakeholders. It is
possible, for example, that the difference in the way in which we
described the importance of income per capita may have influenced
the low priority it obtained in all of the methods. Fifth, the presence
of a significant alternative-specific constant among respondents
from LMICs, but not in HICs, may be due to differences in the way
in which the survey was understood or completion rates among re-
spondents from these different areas. Future research should also at-
tempt to better understand these potential effects and should
consider the inclusion of an opt-out or status-quo alternative, in-
stead of using a forced-choice design.
Sixth, we were not able to directly control what types of people
answered the survey and our results may have differed if we had
been able to obtain responses from a more representative sample.
That said, it is unclear exactly what the most appropriate population
is in this context. We did get very high levels of geographic coverage
in our sample, making our sample more heterogeneous than em-
ployed in previous studies. However, our sample was very highly
educated and it is likely that less educated people would have differ-
ent preferences. Certain categories of stakeholders were also un-
likely to be reached through the method of recruitment used. This
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Probability
Income − High
Income − Medium
Health system − Some
Health system − High
Health inequality − Some
Disease burden − Some
Disease burden − High
Health inequality − High
Full sample High Income
Low and Middle Income
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for full and split samples
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includes the most vulnerable groups and populations and those with
the greatest needs. In future research, a more tailored approach to
these stakeholders should be used. If alignment with stakeholder
preference is a goal, more research could help to elucidate on how to
improve policy and practice.
Finally, some of the categories we used to describe the respond-
ents were not completely mutually exclusive and a more detailed list
of organizations could have been useful.
Conclusion
There is growing awareness of the need to carefully prioritize exter-
nal financing for health across countries. In particular, there is an
increasing understanding of the need to go beyond GNI per capita
alone when classifying countries and allocating health aid. The find-
ings of this study reinforce the view that most stakeholders want to
move beyond GNI per capita as the primary determinant of health
aid eligibility and allocation. The findings also suggest that if donors
want to supplement GNI per capita, health inequalities and disease
burden are key candidates for consideration. The findings of this
study can thus inform ongoing policy discussions and the quest for
sufficiently nuanced frameworks for classifying countries and allo-
cating assistance.
Ethical approval
Exemption from full IRB approval was obtained from the Human
Subjects Office at New York University prior to data collection.
Human subjects were provided informed consent.
Funding
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust [099114/Z/12/Z].
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
References
Alesina A, Dollar D. 2000. Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal
of Economic Growth 5: 33–63.
Bachke ME, Alfnes F, Wik M. 2013. Eliciting donor preferences.
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations 25: 465–86.
Cunningham H, Knowles S, Hansen P. 2016. Bilateral foreign aid: how im-
portant is aid effectiveness to people for choosing countries to support?
Applied Economics Letters 24: 306–10.
Dieleman JL, Graves CM, Templin T et al. 2014. Global health development
assistance remained steady in 2013 but did not align with recipients’ disease
burden.Health Affairs 33: 878–86.
Dieleman JL, Graves C, Johnson E et al. 2015. Sources and focus of health de-
velopment assistance, 1990–2014. JAMA: The Journal of the American
Medical Association 313: 2359–68.
Dollar D, Levin V. 2006. The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–2003:
World Development 34: 2034–46.
Esser D. 2011. Does Global Health Funding Respond to Recipients’ Needs?
Comparing Public and Private Donors’ Allocations in 2005–2007. World
Development, 39:1271–1280.
Fantom NJ, Serajuddin U. 2016. The World Bank’s classification of countries
by income. Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 7528. Washington,
D.C. : World Bank Group. http://docu HYPERLINK http://ments.world
bank.org/curated/en/408581467988942234/The-World-ments.worldbank.
org/curated/en/408581467988942234/The-World- Banks-classification-of-
countries-by-income.
Fielding D. 2011. Health aid and governance in developing countries. Health
Economics 20: 757–69.
Glassman A, Chalkidou K. 2012. Priority-setting in health: building institu-
tions for smarter public spending. Center for Global Development Working.
http://www.cgdev.org/publication/priority-setting-health-building-institu
tions-smarter-public-spending
Gre´pin KA. 2012a. Efficiency considerations of donor fatigue, universal
access to ARTs and health systems. Sexually Transmitted Infections 88:
75–8.
Gre´pin KA. 2012b. HIV donor funding has both boosted and curbed the deliv-
ery of different non-HIV health services in sub-Saharan Africa. Health
Affairs 31: 1406–14.
Hansen P, Kergozou N, Knowles S, Thorsnes P. 2014. Developing countries in
need: which characteristics appeal most to people when donating money?
The Journal of Development Studies 50: 1494–509.
Hole AR. 2007. Estimating mixed logit models using maximum simulated
likelihood. The Stata Journal, 7: 388–401.
Huber J, Zwerina K. 1996. The importance of utility balance in efficient choice
designs. Journal of Marketing Research 33: 307.
Kapilashrami A, Hanefeld J. 2014. Meaningful change or more of the same?
The Global Fund’s new funding model and the politics of HIV scale-up.
Global Public Health 9: 160–75.
Kuziemko I, Werker E. 2006. How much is a seat on the Security Council
worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political
Economy 114: 905–30.
Lancsar E, Louviere J. 2008. Conducting discrete choice experiments to in-
form healthcare decision making. PharmacoEconomics 26: 661–77.
Lee SA, Lim J-Y. 2014. Does international health aid follow recipients’
needs? Extensive and intensive margins of health aid allocation. 64:
104–20.
Mangham LJ, Hanson K, Mcpake B. 2009. How to do (or not to do) . . .
Designing a discrete choice experiment for application in a low-income
country.Health Policy and Planning 24: 151–8.
Murray CJL, Anderson B, Burstein R et al. 2011. Development assistance for
health: trends and prospects. Lancet 378: 8–10.
Ottersen T, Grepin K, Henderson K et al. 2016. An explicit approach to the
design and assessment of country classication frameworks. Norwegian
Insitute of Public Health.
Ottersen T, Kamath A, Moon S, Martinsen L., & Røttingen J. 2017.
Development assistance for health: What criteria do multi- and bilateral fun-
ders use?Health Economics, Policy and Law, 12(2), 223–244. doi:10.1017/
S1744133116000475.
Ottersen T, Gre´pin KA, Henderson K, Pinkstaff CB, Norheim F and Røttingen
J-A. 2017b. New approaches to ranking countries for the allocation of
development assistance for health: choices, indicators and implications.
Health Policy and Planning 33:i31–i46.
Ravishankar N, Gubbins P, Cooley RJ et al. 2009. Financing of global health:
tracking development assistance for health from 1990 to 2007. Lancet 373:
2113–24.
Ryan M, Gerard RK. 2008. Discrete choice experiments in a nutshell. Using
Discrete Choice Experiments to Value Health. http://link.springer.com/chap
ter/10.1007%2F978-1-4020-5753-3_1.
Sridhar D. 2010. Seven challenges in international development assistance for
health and ways forward. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 38:
459–69.
Street DJ, Burgess L, Louviere JJ. 2005. Quick and easy choice sets: construct-
ing optimal and nearly optimal stated choice experiments. International
Journal of Research in Marketing 22: 459–70.
i30 Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Vol. 33, Suppl. 1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/33/suppl_1/i24/4835241
by University of Sheffield user
on 24 April 2018
